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Abstract
One of today’s challenges is producing reliable software in the face of an increasing number of
interacting components. Our system CHET lets developers deﬁne speciﬁcations describing how a
component should be used and checks these speciﬁcations in real Java systems. CHET is able to
check a wide range of complex conditions in large software systems without programmer interven-
tion. It does this by doing a complete and detailed ﬂow analysis of the software and using this
analysis to build a simpler, model program. This paper explores the motivations for CHET, the
speciﬁcation techniques that are used, and the methodology used in statically checking that the
speciﬁcations are obeyed in a system.
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1 Introduction
Much of software engineering is concentrated on ensuring the reliability of
software. Work in this area includes safer languages, contracts, and tools for
ﬁnding speciﬁc problems such as buﬀer overﬂow. Most of this work is limited
in that it considers only the local execution behavior of a system. Software
model checking takes the global behavior into account, but has typically only
been used to prove relatively simple and speciﬁc properties of software. While
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these eﬀorts are helpful, they fail to address many of the problems of modern
software development.
1.1 Software Properties
The goal of our work was to develop a tool that would check that components
are used correctly in large software systems. We wanted a tool that would
take a speciﬁcation of how a component should be used along with the system
and would then identify locations where the component was used incorrectly
without any programmer intervention. While designing and implementing
such a tool we realized that the same mechanisms could be used to check a
wide variety of safety properties such as design patterns, user classes, and
proper use of the programming language itself.
Examples of the properties we are able to specify and the tool is currently
able to check include:
• For each use of an iterator in a program, hasNext() is called exactly once
before next() is called.
• Iterators are not used while the structure is being modiﬁed outside of the
iterator (concurrent modiﬁcation).
• Callbacks are registered before a widget is shown.
• Each ﬁle opened by the application is closed.
• An XML writer component is used such that begin and end pairs match up
and ﬁelds are added before any subelements.
• For a Java byte code library component, a current function is registered
before any attempts to ﬁnd a line number for an instruction are made.
• For a web crawler, each page that is found is processed correctly by ei-
ther indicating error, providing a redirected URL, or by providing the page
contents and the internal text to a URL support library.
• User deﬁned errors (subclasses of java.lang.Error) thrown by the application
are caught.
• Each class that represents an instance of a singleton design pattern [18] has
only one associated object.
• That a chain-of-responsibility design pattern [18] is followed correctly.
• An object of class A is always locked before an object of class B.
• That the matrix stack in JoGL is used correctly.
• That the calls for setting up polygons in JoGL are used in the proper se-
quence.
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• A session id is successfully obtained from a web service before the action
methods are called.
1.2 Tool Requirements
In order for a tool that addresses properties of this sort to be successful it
must meet certain requirements.
First, the properties must be easy to specify in a natural way. We want to
encourage the use of the tool both for checking components and for checking
internal properties of programs. If creating speciﬁcations is overly complex,
programmers won’t bother to create them.
Second, the tool needs to check each instance of the property in the pro-
gram. A complex system can use a lot of iterators, ﬁles, errors, etc. Yet
the tool should check each such use separately. This is the only way that
meaningful information can be returned for each property.
Third, the identiﬁcation of instances of the property in the program has to
be automatic. One cannot expect a programmer to annotate or identify the
hundreds or thousands of instances that occur in a moderately sized system.
Such additional work will discourage the programmer and result in the tool
not being used.
Fourth, the tool has to be fast enough so that programmers would use it
everyday. Such a tool is most useful when it can be applied during program
development. Our goal here has been to produce something that was not
signiﬁcantly slower than compilation.
Finally, the tool had to be as accurate as possible. First it has to be
sound in that it must correctly identify each instance of the property in the
program that does not meet the speciﬁcation. Second it has to minimize false
positives, instances that are identiﬁed as potential failures where failure does
not or cannot occur.
In addition to creating positive requirements, our emphasis on component
checking also lets us make certain simplifying assumptions. Components are
generally used via method calls and it is most often the sequence of method
calls that is important in determining component usage. Data, in the form
of variables or ﬁelds, is generally of secondary importance in determining the
set of such sequences and in the speciﬁcation of valid component usage. This
lets us make certain simplifying assumptions, notably, that we can ignore most
data ﬁelds during our analysis. This greatly reduces the state space that needs
to be explored and helps to make our analysis practical.
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1.3 Results
We have developed a system, CHET, that meets these requirements. The
system has been used to check the above and other properties on a variety
of software systems including simple test programs, small (1-3 Kloc) student
programs from a software engineering course, our current programming sys-
tem (of which CHET is a part; a total of about 68 Kloc), and a variety of
open source systems of up to 100Kloc). In these tests the system has proven
accurate and robust and has demonstrated that the techniques we use are
scalable and practical for large systems.
Performance, while not matching compilation speed, is quite acceptable.
For our own system (68,000 lines of source, 370,000 analyzed byte codes),
CHET takes about 12 minutes to identify over 540 speciﬁcation instances
from within the project and check each of these instances individually. Most
of the smaller systems are checked in under a minute.
1.4 Paper Outline
The key to our system is a speciﬁcation model that is ﬂexible, powerful, gen-
eral enough to deﬁne the various properties, where instances can be quickly
identiﬁed, and where the properties can be eﬃciently checked. We start with
an example of a speciﬁcation in Section 2. We deﬁne CHET’s speciﬁcation
model in Section 3 and related these to the actual code in Section 4. Sec-
tion 5 provides a partial formalization of this model. Section 6 then describes
how our tool checks the speciﬁcation using a combination of ﬂow analysis and
model checking. Section 7 provides a comparison to related work. Finally,
Section 8 summarizes our experiences in using the tool by providing statistics
about running CHET on a variety of systems.
2 An Example
One problem with a Java program is the potential for concurrent modiﬁcation
errors. These occur when an iterator is in use and the structure it is iterating
over changes. We want our system to check that such errors cannot occur.
CHET uses automata driven by parameterized program events to express
the various conditions. Figure 1 shows a simple automaton for checking for
comodiﬁcation in vectors. (note that self-arcs have been suppressed). The
CHET user can deﬁne this directly using an XML ﬁle that deﬁnes the states,
events, parameters, and transitions, or using a graphical editor. The Start
state represents the beginning of the program. An allocation of a Vector
causes us to enter the Play state. We can modify the vector in this state but
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Fig. 1. Comodiﬁcation speciﬁcation.
if we try to iterate, we get an error. Calling the Vector.iterator method on
the vector yields an Iterator object and puts us in the Iterate state. Here we
can call Iterator.next, but any attempt to change the vector causes us to go
back to the Play state. The Ignore state handles cases where the vector is
reallocated. Note that this speciﬁcation is parameterized so that it is meant
to apply to each instance of a Vector created in the program and the call to
iterator or the modiﬁcation methods have to apply to that particular instance.
Moreover, the object returned by the call to iterator is also a parameter and
is used to determine which calls to Iterator.next are relevant.
The seven events associated with this speciﬁcation and their parameters
are shown in Figure 2. The ﬁrst event occurs when a vector is allocated.
The parameter represented by C1 for this event is deﬁned as the result of
the allocation. The next three events represent ways of modifying the Vector.
The use of the parameter here ensures that these calls refer to the instance
of the Vector that whose allocation we are considering. Additional events
could be deﬁned to check for other modiﬁcations. Event E5 occurs when a
new iterator for this Vector is created. It is restricted by its dependence on
C1 and deﬁnes a new parameter, C2, reﬂecting the Iterator object. The ﬁnal
two events then represent uses of the iterator and are restricted to calls where
the object represented by C2 could be the this parameter. Note that CHET
generates and checks an instance of the speciﬁcation for each potential pair of
Vector-Iterator (C1-C2) instances it ﬁnds in the code.
3 Speciﬁcations
The speciﬁcation model in CHET uses extended ﬁnite state automata over
parameterized events. Finite automata are relatively easy to deﬁne for the
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Event Type Parameter
E1 (New) ALLOC(Vector) C1 = result
E2 (Add) CALL(add) this = C1
E3 (Add1) CALL(addElement) this = C1
E4 (Add2) CALL(addAll) this = C1
E5 (Iter) RETURN(iterator) this = C1 C2 = return
E6 (Next) CALL ( next) this = C2
E7 (Next1) CALL (nextElement) this = C2
Fig. 2. Events in the speciﬁcation of Figure 1.
various properties and are generally well understood by programmers. We use
an extended form that uses bounded local variables to simplify nested speciﬁ-
cations. The automata are driven by events representing program actions or
states. The set of available events is central to both specifying and identifying
properties. A graphical editor is available for the programmer to deﬁne such
speciﬁcations.
3.1 Events
Events represent the basic actions of the program relevant to a particular
property. In order to express a broad range of properties, we needed to have
a variety of actions. For components, most of these actions relate to call-
ing methods of the components. Other relevant actions include creating a
component, setting ﬁelds, handling exceptions, and locking.
To support automatic identiﬁcation of property occurrences, we need to
have events describing what is going on at run time that can be detected
statically from the code. More importantly, we must restrict these events to
a particular occurrence of a property. This is done by having the events be
parameterized. Parameters on events are used both to deﬁne and limit their
occurrence. For example, we can look at the use of a particular Iterator in
the program by associating a parameter with a particular allocation of the
iterator and then only looking at the calls to the methods next and hasNext
that can be have that particular object as the this parameter. Noting that the
problem of identifying speciﬁc events in this context is similar to that faced
by aspect-oriented languages we deﬁned our initial event set based on those
used in Aspect/J [27]
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The set of events that we currently provide include:
• CALL events that can be parameterized by a combination of the this object,
an argument of the method, or the this object of the calling method.
• RETURN events that can be parameterized by the this object of the call or
the value being returned.
• FIELD events occurring when a given ﬁeld is assigned a given value. The
event can be parameterized by the object containing the ﬁeld.
• ALLOC events triggered by an allocation and parameterized by the object
being allocated.
• CATCH and THROW events parameterized by the appropriate object.
• LOCK and UNLOCK events parameterized by the object being synchro-
nized.
This set is suﬃcient for deﬁning a wide range of speciﬁcations. In addition,
the system is designed to be extensible so that new event types can be added
as long the instructions generating the event can be determined using ﬂow
analysis. Adding a new event type involves deﬁning a new subclass for the
event and adding the appropriate call to generate an instance of the class.
The current events are implemented in 100-200 lines of code.
3.2 Using Event Parameters
Parameters are associated with events using a full interprocedural ﬂow analysis
of the program. This analysis is based on sources. A source is a representation
of a value that has a speciﬁc creation point. For each source, our ﬂow analysis
computes all points in the program to which the source can ﬂow. We use
several types of sources. Local sources represent objects created directly by the
code. Each new operator creates a new local source of the corresponding type.
Arrays are represented as specialized local sources. Fixed sources are used to
represent values that are created implicitly, either by the run time system or
by native code. Finally, model sources are those that we add speciﬁcally to
identify instances of a speciﬁcation.
Each speciﬁcation must include one event that is marked as a trigger. Each
instance of this event in the system identiﬁes an occurrence of the correspond-
ing property. We introduce a new model source to uniquely identify each
static instance of a trigger event. During ﬂow analysis, this source associated
with the value corresponding to the parameter of the trigger event. The ﬂow
of this source then is used to determine what other events are relevant to
the property. For example, a RETURN trigger event identiﬁes a new model
source representing the value returned at each associated call. CHET deﬁnes
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an occurrence of the speciﬁcation for each such instance; the uses of the cor-
responding source would then identify the CALL or FIELD events that were
relevant to the particular occurrence.
To allow multiple parameters in a speciﬁcation as in the example of Fig-
ure 1, we associate a parameter mode with each parameter. The mode for a
parameter that is not being created is CHECK. A parameter mode of NEW is
used to provide an initial value for additional parameters. Other modes allow
redeﬁnition or reuse of a parameter.
Where multiple parameters occur, CHET computes all possible sets of oc-
currences. It ﬁrst does a topological sort of all NEW parameters based on the
speciﬁcation. It uses the trigger event to deﬁne an initial partial occurrence,
and then uses ﬂow analysis to ﬁnd all locations where the second parameter
can be used, forming a new (potentially partial) occurrence for each. This
procedure is followed for any additional parameters.
The ﬂow analysis does a symbolic interprocedural execution of the whole
program (including libraries). This analysis tracks the possible sets of sources
on the stack, in local variables, and in ﬁelds and arrays at each point in
the program. The sets of sources are represented as values which include
information about the data type, whether the value can or must be null, the
actual set of sources, and, for numerics, an optional range.
The analysis accurately tracks ﬁeld and array values, selectively inlines
methods based on the calling parameters, and models key Java data structures
including hash tables and vectors. It also is able to handle the complexities
of Java including native code, exceptions, threads, callbacks, dynamic loading
and binding using reﬂection, and the implicit execution semantics of Java such
as calls to static initializers and implicit ﬁeld initializations.
The ﬂow analysis is a conservative approximation. It ensures that if there
is an execution where a source can ﬂow to a particular point in the program,
then the source will be associated with that point. It is conservative in that
sources will be associated with points even in cases where no possible execution
could result in that association.
3.3 Automata
Each property speciﬁcation deﬁnes the set of relevant events, the set of event
parameters, and an automaton over the events. The automaton consists of
uninterpreted but labeled states and event-based transitions. Each automaton
has a unique starting state. Each state can be tagged with a property indi-
cating whether ending in this state represents an error, success, ambiguous,
or don’t care.
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Transitions between the states consist of an event, a condition, and a set of
actions. The condition and actions are based on automata variables which can
range over bounded integral values. This extension to normal automata lets us
specify limited instances of what would otherwise be context-free properties.
For example, we have used them to specify that the number of entries and
exits match for the XML writer class, assuming that we never nest the XML
more than a ﬁnite amount.
4 Abstract Programs
To eﬃciently check each occurrence of a speciﬁcation in the user’s application,
we generate an abstract program that models the application’s behavior with
respect to that particular occurrence. The abstract program is restricted to
include only a simpliﬁcation of that part of the code that can generate events
relevant to the occurrence. These programs are generated in a separate phase
that takes advantage of the information gleamed from the ﬂow analysis.
This abstraction ensures that if there is an execution of the actual program
exhibiting a certain sequence of speciﬁcation events, then there is an execution
of the abstract program generating the same sequence. This is conservative in
that the abstract program may generate sequences that can never be exhibited
in the actual program.
The abstract program consists of a set of routines. Each routine is com-
posed of nodes and arcs similar to an automaton. There are actions associated
with each node, but the arcs are uninterpreted. The associated actions control
the behavior of the program and the generation of events. The current actions
include:
• Enter a routine (Enter).
• Exit a routine (return or end of program) (Exit).
• Call a routine (Call).
• Generate an event for the particular property being checked (Event).
• Set a variable or return value to a given value (Set).
• Test a variable or return value (Test).
• Asynchronous call (e.g. start of a thread) (ACall).
• Begin synchronization for a set of sources (Synch).
• End synchronization for a set of sources (Esynch).
• Wait or timed wait on a set of sources (Wait).
• Notify or notify all on a set of sources (Notify).
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• Do nothing (Nop).
• Start a callback thread (CallOnce)
The ﬁrst step in building the abstract program is to determine the set
of ﬁelds to be considered. This is done by starting with those explicitly
mentioned in the speciﬁcation and then using the ﬂow analysis to determine
heuristically what other ﬁelds are particularly relevant. Adding ﬁelds here
helps remove false positives at the cost of increased analysis time, but the lack
of ﬁelds doesn’t aﬀect the correctness of the approach.
The abstract program is built in four stages. First, it ﬁnds the location of
all the events that deﬁne new parameters for the test. For simple tests with
a single trigger event, this is trivial since it is based on the deﬁnition of the
check. For more complex tests such as comodiﬁcation, this requires a quick
pass over the byte codes of the application.
Next CHET makes a pass over the byte codes to determine any ﬁelds that
might be relevant to the check. Here it looks primarily for ﬁelds that can
aﬀect the control ﬂow relevant to generating events.
Third, CHET makes a quick scan over the program to determine what
routines are relevant to this particular abstract program and what routines
can be ignored. This is done by ﬁrst looking at each routine to determine if it
can generate events relevant to the speciﬁcation. These are the base routines
that need to be included in the resultant program. Then it uses the call graph
built during the ﬂow analysis pass to determine what other routines need to
be included. This check is fast and typically eliminates 50
Finally, the actual abstract program is generated by walking over the byte
codes for each routine using a path-sensitive analysis that tracks the values of
local variables. The system builds the abstraction for each routine, and then
simpliﬁes the overall abstract program by eliminating unnecessary routines
(those that aren’t used), calls to routines with no actions, and nodes that do
nothing. The diﬃcult problem here is identifying when the events associated
with the speciﬁcation may be generated.
Each type of event can be tied to speciﬁc instructions in the application
code. CALL and RETURN events may be generated by invoke instructions
for a particular method; ALLOC events may be generated by new instructions
for a particular class; FIELD events may be generated by putﬁeld or putstatic
instructions for a particular ﬁeld; THROW events may be generated by athrow
instructions; ENTRY events may be generated at the ﬁrst instruction of a
routine; CATCH events may be generated at the ﬁrst instruction of a catch
block; LOCK events may be generated either on a monitorenter instruction
or the ﬁrst instruction of a synchronized method; UNLOCK events may be
generated either on a monitorexit instruction or a return from a synchronized
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Fig. 3. The generated abstract program.
method. The real problem here is identifying the actual events using the event
parameters.
This problem is addressed by maintaining a set of associated sources for
each event parameter. The set is initially deﬁned by the choice of the occur-
rence. The trigger event parameter is associated with the model source; any
additional new parameters are associated with the set of sources that were
identiﬁed by ﬂow analysis at the location identiﬁed for the secondary event.
For each potential event occurrence, we look at the set of sources for that
event and compare them to the set associated with the check. Normally, the
mode of the parameter is CHECK. Here the possible sources for an instruction
need to include the sources previously associated with the parameter. If they
do, then the intersection of the two source sets becomes the parameter source
set. Note that intersection is correct here in that we are generally attempting
to isolate a single source from all the rules.
Figure 3 next shows the abstract program generated for one instance of this
speciﬁcation of Figure 1. The relevant source code from which this abstract
program is generated is shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5.
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public static void main(String [] args)
{
CrawlMain cm = new CrawlMain(args);
cm.process();
System.exit(0);
}
private CrawlMain(String [] args)
{
num_threads = CRAWL_NUM_THREADS;
url_file = CRAWLER_URL_FILE;
do_test = true;
do_create = false;
start_at = 0;
url_count = CRAWL_DEFAULT_URL_COUNT;
active_count = 0;
page_total = CRAWL_DEFAULT_TOTAL;
pages_queued = 0;
work_sema = new Object();
work_queue = new HashSet();
urls_sema = new Object();
urls_done = new HashSet();
future_sema = new Object();
future_urls = new HashSet();
thread_set = new Vector();
scanArgs(args);
url_manager = CrawlerFactory.createUrlManager();
url_manager.setDoTesting(do_test);
if (do_create) {
try {
url_manager.clearRepository();
}
catch (IOException e) {
System.err.println("Error with repository: " + e);
System.exit(1);
}
}
}
Fig. 4. The methods from which the abstract program is generated (part 1).
S.P. Reiss / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 144 (2006) 107–132118
private void process()
{
active_count = 1; // don’t let things terminate
System.err.println("CRAWL: Start processing");
startThreads();
loadUrls();
synchronized(work_sema) {
active_count -= 1; // we are no longer active;
if (active_count == 0) work_sema.notifyAll();
}
waitForDone();
url_manager.addFutureUrls(url_file,future_urls);
System.err.println("CRAWL: Done processing");
}
private void startThreads()
{
for (int i = 0; i < num_threads; ++i) {
CrawlThread ct = new CrawlThread(this,i);
thread_set.add(ct);
synchronized(work_sema) {
++active_count;
ct.start();
}
}
}
private void waitForDone()
{
for (Iterator it = thread_set.iterator(); it.hasNext(); ) {
CrawlThread ct = (CrawlThread) it.next();
try {
ct.join();
}
catch (InterruptedException e) { }
}
}
Fig. 5. The methods from which the abstract program is generated (part 2).
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5 Formal Model
A better understanding of exactly how our system understands speciﬁcations
and generates an abstract program for a particular speciﬁcation can be ob-
tained by formalizing the process. We start by considering speciﬁcations. A
speciﬁcation is an automaton with uninterpreted states, driven by a sequence
of events. It can be viewed as a 5-tuple:
(Σ, S, E, P,M)
where Σ is the set of states, S ∈ Σ is a distinguished state called the start
state, E is the set of events, P ⊆ Σ × E → Σ is the set of transitions, and
M ⊆ Σ → A,X, I,Q is a mapping indicating for each state whether it is an
accepting state, an error state, an ignore state, or unknown.
The interpretation of a speciﬁcation for a sequence of events E1, . . . , En is
the result of applying P consecutively beginning with the start state to each
Ei in turn. The result of this interpretation is found by applying M to the
ﬁnal state.
Understanding how the speciﬁcation is related to the program is more
complex. We start by considering the application code as a sequence of in-
structions, C = (c1, c2, . . . , cn). Let R be a the set of routines in the program.
We assume that each ci is associated with a unique routine and that each
routine r ∈ R has a unique starting point cr in the code. We deﬁne the
non-call control ﬂow of the application in terms of C as the relation F where
(ci, cj) ∈ F if and only if ci can immediately precede cj in some execution and
both ci and cj and are in the same routine.
From the application code we generate an abstract program which can be
represented as the 6-tuple:
(Π, T, R,Γ, A,Θ)
where Π is the set of states, T ⊆ Π× Π is the set of transitions, R is the set
of routines from the code, Γ ⊆ R → Π is a mapping that identiﬁes the start
state for each routine, A is a set of actions, and Θ ⊆ Π → A is a mapping
that associates an action with each state.
For illustrative purposes, we only consider a basic set of actions A. These
are Call[r] where r ∈ R, Exit, Nop, and Event[e] where e ∈ E, the set of
speciﬁcation events. The formalism extends naturally to the other abstract
program actions by including the appropriate information as part of the state.
To deﬁne the mapping from the original code to the abstract program, we
consider pieces of the abstract program. We deﬁne an abstract fragment as
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the 5-tuple:
H = (π, t, πs, πe,ΘH)
where π ⊆ Π is a subset of the states of the overall program, t ⊆ π×π ⊆ T is
a subset of the transitions restricted to the local states, πs and πe are elements
of π representing a unique starting and ending state for this fragment, and
ΘH speciﬁes the actions associated with the states. These abstract fragments
are used to build the overall abstract program using the mapping G ⊆ c → H
which takes each instruction ci and maps it into an abstract fragment Hi.
The mapping deﬁned by G must capture the essence of the program. In
particular it must insure that
(i) If ci can invoke a routine r in any execution, then H must reﬂect this
with an action Call[r].
(ii) If ci can be associated with an event e in any execution, then H must
reﬂect this with an action Event[e].
(iii) If ci is the ﬁrst instruction of a routine, the H must reﬂect this with an
Enter action.
(iv) If ci can result in a return from a routine r in any execution, then H must
reﬂect this with an action Exit.
We need to have G generate a fragment since a particular instruction might
invoke one of a set of routines (in which case the fragment is the OR of the
calls), might generate multiple events, or might generate an event and then do
a call (and then generate another event). The information needed to compute
G comes both from the semantics of the instructions (i.e. the deﬁnition of the
Java virtual machine), and from the results of the ﬂow analysis which tells us
which routines can be invoked at a particular instruction (using type analysis)
and which events can be associated with an instruction (using sources). Using
G, the initial abstract program is deﬁned by:
(i) Deﬁning Π as the union of all π, T0 as the union of all t, and Θ as the
union of the ΘH .
(ii) Deﬁning the mapping Γ by mapping each routine to the start state of the
ﬁrst instruction of that routine.
(iii) Deﬁning T by augmenting T0 with connections from the end state of each
fragment Hi to the start state of each fragment Hj where (ci, cj) ∈ F .
Executions of the abstract program are then deﬁned using this set of ac-
tions and considering all possible transitions. In particular, we deﬁne a possi-
ble execution of an abstract program as a sequence of tuples (πi, ki, oi) where
πi represents the current state, ki is a list of state representing the current
stack, and oi is the sequence of events representing program output to this
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point. The tuples must obey the following rules (where <> is the empty list
and (a|B) represents the list obtained by putting the element a in front of the
list B):
(i) π1 = Γ(r0), k1 =<>, o1 =<> where r0 is a start method of the program
(e.g. main).
(ii) If Θ(πi) = Call[r] then we simulate a call by setting πi+1 = Γ(r), ki+1 =
(πi|ki), oi+1 = oi.
(iii) If Θ(πi) = Exit and ki =<> then the program execution is over.
(iv) If Θ(πi) = Exit and ki =< πα|k > then we simulate a return with
(πα, πi+1) ∈ T, ki+1 = k, oi+1 = oi.
(v) If Θ(πi) = Nop then the next step must satisfy (πi, πi+1) ∈ T, ki+1 =
ki, oi+1 = oi.
(vi) If Θ(πi) = Event[e] then the next step must satisfy (πi, πi+1) ∈ T, ki+1 =
ki, oi+1 = (oi|e).
The actual abstract program is deﬁned as a simpliﬁcation of this program.
The simpliﬁcation involves removing all nodes that have an associated Nop
action and are not starting nodes for a routine and removing all nodes with
an associated Call Action that calls a routine which has only a Return node
(or a Nop and a Return). It should be clear from the above deﬁnitions that
if there is an execution of the original abstract program that generates an
event sequence , then there is also an execution of the simpliﬁed program that
generates the same event sequence.
The checking done by CHET is then predicated on the relationship between
the original program and the ﬁnal abstract program. Here we claim (proof
depends on a detailed model of the JVM and is beyond the scope of this
paper):
Claim 5.1 If there exists an execution of the original program such that the
events e1 . . . en would occur in that order, then there exists an execution of the
abstract program (π1, k1, o1) . . . (πα, kα, oα) where oα = e1 . . . en.
This implies that the checking is a conservative approximation in that if
the program can possibly generate a sequence of events, then the abstract
program is guaranteed to reﬂect that. In particular it implies that:
Claim 5.2 If for all output sequences oα of the abstract program, the ﬁnal
state of the speciﬁcation automaton under that sequence is not an error state,
then the speciﬁcation is guaranteed to hold in all executions of the original
program.
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6 Checking Speciﬁcations
The remainder of the CHET system involves doing this last check. That
is, the system looks at all possible executions of the abstract program and
eﬀectively determines the ﬁnal speciﬁcation state resulting from the sequence
of events generated by each execution. Given that the number of possible
executions is very large, this is done using model-checking techniques and
a dynamic programming approach where we eﬀectively execute the abstract
program and the checking automaton in parallel.
Many of the speciﬁcations we want to check only involve a single thread of
execution. For example, it is rare for a program to create an iterator in one
thread and use it in another. Realizing this, we treat the single threaded case
diﬀerently from the multithreaded case.
For the single threaded case we do a form of context-free model checking
[26,31].We determine the set of checking states that are reachable at each
node of the abstract program. A checking state here consists of a state from
the speciﬁcation (e.g. Play from Figure 1) along with values for each of the
monitored variables and the latest return value. Value settings are currently
limited to {Null, NonNull, Unknown} for objects and either a speciﬁc value
or Unknown for numerics.
Checking is done by determining for each routine and each possible check-
ing state on entry to that routine, the set of checking states that are possible
on exit using a worklist algorithm, and using these summaries whenever pos-
sible. To handle routines that may not return, we distinguish speciﬁcation
states for which all transitions go to the state itself. These states represent
either error conditions or a desired target state. Whenever the simulation gets
into one of these states, we simulate an immediate return from the current
method. This ensures that if the program can reach one of these ”ﬁnal” states,
the algorithm will detect it.
For the example of Figure 3, the algorithm determines that there are two
possible ﬁnal states assuming you start in the Start state executing main. In
particular, you can end in state Play by invoking ¡init¿ and skipping process,
or you can end in state Iterate by invoking ¡init¿ and process, startThreads,
and possibly waitForDone.
To handle multiple threads, we create an abstraction for each thread as in
[4,17]. We ﬁnd all instances of threads by looking for asynchronous call nodes
in the abstract program. We convert each instance into its own automa-
ton based using an inlining process. We extend the single-threaded checking
approach by adding the state of these automata to the checking state and
handling the possible transitions within the automata when we determine the
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next state.
Synchronization checking is optional here since it is essentially unsafe.
However, in most of the programs we have looked at, once they are restricted
to a particular speciﬁcation, the approximate synchronization represented by
the set of sources has accurately reﬂected the actual synchronization done by
the program and hence yields a more meaningful abstract program.
6.1 Reporting the Result
The output from the above procedure is simply the set of possible ending states
that can be achieved for a given main program. It does not include control
ﬂow information that indicates how a particular state can actually be attained
in a run. Thus, it does not provide enough information for a programmer to
understand why or how the program gets into these states. To provide this
information, we augmented the framework to produce a trace of the execution
to the point where the target state is reached.
This is done as a separate pass over the abstract program. This pass uses
much of the same techniques as the checking pass, but does a breadth-ﬁrst
search over the executions while tracking calls and attempting to ﬁnd the
speciﬁed target state.
CHET generates output for each possible ﬁnal speciﬁcation state that is
not speciﬁcally ignored. This output consists of a trace of the relevant branch
points and calls from the original program that would result in the particular
ﬁnal state. A front end lets the user step through the resultant trace and see
the corresponding source code. An example of this is shown in Figure 6.
7 Related Work
Checking properties of software systems has a long history that includes orig-
inal attempts at proving software correct, extended compiler checking such
as Lint [32], static condition checking as in CCEL [12], and veriﬁcation-based
static checking such as in LCLint [16]. More recently and more related to our
work, there has been a signiﬁcant body of work on software model checking
[24].
Software model checking typically starts with a software system and a
property to check. The software system is then abstracted into a represen-
tation that is more amenable to model checking by abstracting the original
program into a much smaller program and then converting that program into
a ﬁnite state representation. The various systems that have been developed
diﬀer in what they consider the software system to be checked, in the way they
deﬁne the property to be checked, in the way they do abstraction, in how they
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Fig. 6. Sample output trace.
map the program into a ﬁnite state representation, and in how they actually
do the checking. Our tool combines aspects of a number of other systems to
meet the requirements outlined above.
Most of the software model checking systems start with source code. For
example, the original Java Pathﬁnder [19,20] translated Java programs into
Promela, the input language for the SPIN model checker [23,24], while MAGIC
starts by analyzing C programs to build a control ﬂow graph [7]. Java Path-
ﬁnder 2 [5,30,36] instead starts from Java byte codes, essentially a binary
representation, while the Bandera system [9,10,13] uses both the source and
the byte code representation. The advantages of using the binary representa-
tion are that it is often simpler than the source, one does not have to worry
about the vagaries of the language, and, most importantly, one can check not
only the user’s system but also the interactions between the user’s system and
libraries, a feature that is needed to analyze real programs. Thus we also start
with byte code, using IBM’s JikesBT package [28].
Finite state automata are the principal representations used for specifying
properties. These are deﬁned either directly or using a language that can
be mapped into a ﬁnite state representation. The automata are triggered by
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program events and it is the characterization of these program events that dif-
ferentiates the systems. Most of the systems including Bandera and Flavers
[8] require that the user explicitly deﬁne events or predicates in terms of the
code for each item being checked, although the Bandera Speciﬁcation Lan-
guage allows parameterized speciﬁcations similar to what we can do. Other
systems such as Metal [15] and ESP [11] use simple parameterized source code
patterns which let the programmers specify all events of a given type with a
single speciﬁcation. SLIC [1] achieves the same eﬀect using an event-oriented
language. The MaC framework [29] takes a similar approach for specifying
dynamic instrumentation using an event deﬁnition language. Patterns have
also been used to simplify the deﬁnition of commonly occurring idioms in the
speciﬁcations [14]. MAGIC uses labeled transition systems (LTS) to model
procedures where the labels correspond to program statements. The Bogor
framework uses the Java Modeling Language (JML). This consists of com-
ments that contain pre and post conditions [33,34]. Our approach provides
the automatic functionality of Metal or ESP using an event-based speciﬁcation
similar to MaC or SLIC. This lets us check the type of complex conditions
that the latter tools can handle while providing the ease of use of the former
ones.
One key to successful software model checking is the generation of small
abstractions that reﬂect the property being checked without irrelevant de-
tails. The diﬀerent approaches do this in diﬀerent ways. The C2BP package
within SLAM [2,3] and Java Pathﬁnder [35] convert the user’s code into a
Boolean program using predicate abstraction where each predicate relevant
to the speciﬁcation being checked is replaced with a Boolean variable. Ban-
dera uses data abstraction to map the program types into abstract predicates
that can be ﬁnitely modeled. Trailblazer looks only at control ﬂow events
and actions and eliminates all data [25]. ESP does a combination of control
and data ﬂow analysis to build a simpliﬁed version of the original program.
Flavers constructs a trace ﬂow graph by inlining control ﬂow graphs of the
various methods and adding arcs to represent synchronization events. Java
Pathﬁnder 2 uses static analysis to reduce the state space by ﬁnding concur-
rent transitions [6]. Bandera, ESP, Java Pathﬁnder, and Flavers all use some
type of slicing technology to restrict the abstraction to those portions of the
program that are relevant to the conditions being checked. BLAST takes an
additional step, using the veriﬁcation process to identify what needs to be
reﬁned in the abstraction and building a new model based on this information
[21]. Later work on BLAST uses Craig interpolation and proof techniques
to better the abstraction [22]. MAGIC builds ﬁnite data abstractions based
on the predicates being checked and uses these to augment a control ﬂow
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graph. Our approach to date is probably closest to that of ESP in that we use
both control and data ﬂow analysis. However, we limit ourselves to a small,
heuristically chosen subset of the relevant variables, which greatly simpliﬁes
the abstraction in exchange for a loss of accuracy, and we achieve the eﬀect of
path-sensitive analysis using automata simpliﬁcation techniques.
The various systems also diﬀer in their representation of an abstract pro-
gram for checking. Some of the systems actually generate an automaton. For
example, Flavers inlines routines and adds synchronization arcs to build a
single large automaton that can be checked, while MAGIC uses its program
analysis to build a model representing the implementation that can be com-
pared to the model representing the speciﬁcation using model checking. Ban-
dera and the ﬁrst Java Pathﬁnder map the program into Promela, the input
language for the SPIN model checker. Our approach is diﬀerent. We generate
an abstract program with calls, synchronized blocks, and events. This lets us
handle complex and recursive programs easily and compactly. In addition, we
use a Flavers-like automaton (still with calls, synchronized blocks and events)
to represent the behavior of each program thread other than the primary one.
Checking in Bandera is done using external model checkers such as the
SPIN model checker. SLAM and Java Pathﬁnder 2 use their own model
checkers, SLAM’s is based on Boolean programs, and Pathﬁnder’s is based on
a modiﬁed JVM [5,30]. Our approach has been to develop our own checker
to match our program-like abstraction representation. The checker is unique
in the way it handles routines and synchronization, and extends from a de-
tailed single-threaded analysis to an approximate multithreaded analysis quite
naturally.
The work described here is probably closest to that of ESP. Both use ﬁnite-
state speciﬁcations to describe the problem, although ESP’s are code-based
while ours are event-based. Both use data ﬂow analysis to limit the study
of the program to the particular case at hand. Here the two diﬀer in their
approach. ESP does property simulation, using the speciﬁcation information
to drive the data ﬂow. Given a set of variables from the speciﬁcation, it de-
termines which branches have any eﬀect on those variables as part of ﬂow
analysis, merging paths that don’t aﬀect these variables or make other state
transitions. Our approach is much simpler but potentially less accurate. First
we do a generic data ﬂow pass which considers, in a limited way, all vari-
ables and their values. Second, we do a cursory second data ﬂow analysis to
choose the variables that should be considered, with the only criteria that the
variables are used directly in a conditional that determines whether an event
is generated or not. Finally, we build a complete abstract program and then
eliminate any irrelevant paths using an automata simpliﬁcation approach. For
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System LOC #BC Proj #BC ﬂow time Total Time
Onsets 2669 155645 6248 44.97 1:05.91
Crawler 3556 205514 5455 68.14 1:25.11
Pinball 11264 241264 54892 72.89 1:38.63
Freecs 20570 228163 50567 109.77 3:05.62
Taiga 51391 194923 15404 52.63 1:33.96
Egothor 54317 559898 268663 371.89 9:46.06
Clime 64998 421709 117575 255.85 13:06.20
Jalopy 94636 639310 348843 1697.79 31:32.11
Openjms 95470 308198 30787 384.53 7:19.74
Fig. 7. The results of running CHET on various systems.
most cases, the eﬀect is the same – we only have to check paths in the program
that are relevant to the speciﬁcation.
8 Experience
We have written and text the speciﬁcations for the properties listed in the
introduction in our speciﬁcation language. The speciﬁcations tend to be small,
all handled with fewer than 10 states and fewer than 12 diﬀerent events.
The tables in Figure 7 and Figure 8 summarize some of our experience
with CHET. The ﬁrst column in both ﬁgures indicates the system: Onsets is
a mathematical game based on sets, Crawler is a web crawler, Pinball is a 3D
pinball program, Freecs is a shareware chat program, Taiga is a distributed
programming system, Egothor is an open source text search engine, Clime is
our constraint based programming environment which includes CHET, Jalopy
is an open source Java pretty printer, and Openjms is an open source imple-
mentation of the Java message service.
The second through fourth columns of Figure 7 indicate the size of the
systems, ﬁrst in lines of code, then in number of byte codes analyzed overall
and within the project respectively. Discrepancies here are generally due to
uses of Java reﬂection that we did not detect in the open source systems.
The ﬁfth column gives the time in seconds for CHET’s interprocedural ﬂow
analysis, while the sixth is the total time taken by CHET to analyze the
system.
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System # Tests # Errors Avg Test Max Test
Onsets 10 3 3.4 17.0
Crawler 25 11 3.5 14.0
Pinball 39 7 61.8 673.0
Freecs 68 2 10.7 452.0
Taiga 39 3 2.36 44.0
Egothor 152 27 5.7 66.0
Clime 571 20 14.0 2563.0
Jalopy 36 9 18.5 222.0
Openjms 54 45 2.24 30
Fig. 8. The results of running CHET on various systems.
The second and third columns of Figure 8 indicate the number of test
instances that were identiﬁed and the number of errors that were detected.
Relatively small numbers of tests for some of the systems here are generally due
to the fact that while we correctly identify and do ﬂow analysis for speciﬁcation
instances that occur during callbacks, we did not test such instances. The
next two columns indicate the average and maximum time for a single test in
milliseconds.
For several of these cases, most notably those involving Clime, we have
gone through each individual test and checked manually whether the error
reports were accurate. We have also manually checked in all of our systems
that all instances of each of the particular tests were caught and analyzed by
CHET.
The diﬀerence between the ﬂow time and the total time is primarily the
time it takes CHET to ﬁnd the tests, generate the abstract programs, and
then check each of the tests. Finding the tests involves identifying those
routines that are not involved in any check, ﬁnding the relevant ﬁelds for each
test using a simple ﬂow analysis and ﬁnding instances of tests that involve
multiple sources, again using a simple ﬂow analysis. On most systems, this
takes about half the time. Building the abstract programs in a path-sensitive
fashion and checking these programs takes the rest. The program building
pass is fast enough so that its time is dominated by the checking time.
The table shows that the ﬂow analysis essentially dominates the perfor-
mance of the system and the ﬂow analysis is dependent mainly on the com-
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plexity of the code and the number of byte codes in the project. Instances
of the various speciﬁcations are found readily and accurately. Most instances
are checked in around 10 milliseconds, with only a few outliers taking on the
order of seconds. The bulk of the remaining time (about 20the set of ﬁelds to
use during checking.
More notably, the table together with our manual checks show that the
technology in CHET can ﬁnd and check large numbers of instances of relatively
complex software conditions in real Java systems both quickly and accurately.
CHET itself comprises about 30,000 lines of Java code. In addition, our
visual front end and editor (from which the ﬁgures in this paper were taken),
is another 7,000 lines. The code is available from
http://www.cs.brown.edu/people/spr/research/envclime.html.
9 Summary
The analysis has proven to be quite robust. Of the 540 checks that are done
on our own system, it reports 33 errors, of which 15 are false positives. The
rest are actual violations, mainly instances where exceptions that should never
actually occur could cause the speciﬁcations to be violated.
Our work on CHET demonstrates that it is possible to eﬀectively and au-
tomatically check signiﬁcant properties in large software systems. Using spec-
iﬁcations that consist of simple automata over parameterized events lets us
check a variety of properties and provides, along with ﬂow analysis, the infor-
mation needed to both automatically isolate all instances of those properties
and to generate easily-checkable abstract programs for each such instance.
Our checking techniques provide a high degree of accuracy in the common
single threaded case with relatively few false positives and extend naturally
to the threaded cases.
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